Tailoring restoration interventions to the grassland-savanna-forest complex in central Brazil

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Understanding the Relationship between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance

While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on firm perfor- mance, it has largely ignored the effect of firm performance on founder-CEO status. In this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the firm’s founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO status, we Þnd strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions. This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance cannot be esti- mated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Perhaps surprisingly, we Þnd that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. This result appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to remain as CEOs following poor performance. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, we find a residual positive correlation between founder-CEO status and firm performance. This finding suggests that there is a positive causal link from founder-CEOs to firm performance

Fallible Executives, Centralization of Decision-Making and Corporate Performance

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decision making for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the firm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the firm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOUNDER-CEOS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance, it has largely ignored the effect of firm performance on founder-CEO status. In this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the Þrm s founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO status, we find strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions. This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance cannot be estimated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. This result appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to remain as CEOs following poor performance. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, we find a residual positive correlation between founder-CEO status and firm performance. This finding suggests that there is a positive causal link from founder-CEOs to Þrm performance

FALLIBLE EXECUTIVES, CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decisionmaking for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is signif- icantly more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

Nonlinear dynamic analysis for safety assessment of heritage buildings: Church of Santa Maria de Bélem

Despite the remarkable longevity of heritage constructions, they typically present several structural fragilities inherent to their own material and constructive features. This fact is particularly relevant when seismic loads are concerned, because a very significant portion of such constructions lack adequate seismic resistance and require retrofitting interventions in order to mitigate their vulnerability. However, to guarantee the success of the interventions, the interventions should be carefully selected based on a full understanding of the dynamic response of the building and, particularly, its most vulnerable structural elements. Due to many reasons, the issues associated with this kind of analysis are still difficult to address; therefore, research on this subject should be encouraged. Taking this into account, the church of Santa Maria de Belem, one of the most emblematic buildings of the monastery of Jeronimos complex in Lisbon, is used in this work as a case study to discuss the nonlinear dynamic response of cultural heritage buildings. The nonlinear dynamic behavior of the church was numerically simulated with a three-dimensional (3D) model using artificially generated seismic acceleration time histories, in agreement with seismic hazard scenarios for return periods of 475, 975, and 5,000 years. The dynamic response of the church is discussed and a comparison against results derived from a pushover analysis is also presented. Finally, a modal analysis is presented, estimating the damage level that would be present in the church after the occurrence of such seismic scenarios.This work was partly financed by European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funds through the Operational Programme Competitiveness Factors (COMPETE) and by national funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) within the scope of project POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007633. The authors are also grateful to three anonymous reviewers whose comments significantly improved the clarity of the paper

FALLIBLE EXECUTIVES, CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decisionmaking for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is signif- icantly more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

Fallible Executives, Centralization of Decision-Making and Corporate Performance

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decision making for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the firm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the firm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability